

# **Operation Enduring Freedom as an Enabling Campaign in the War on Terrorism**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## **Abstract**

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AS AN ENABLING CAMPAIGN IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM by MAJ John G. Clement, U.S. Army, 54 pages.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon left the American public in a state of anguish and anger. With the debris still smoldering in the streets of New York, Bush stated that the United States and all those who want global peace will stand united to “win the war against terrorism.” Less than a month later, Bush announced the beginning of Operation Enduring freedom, the first military action in the broad “campaign against terrorism.” James W. Reed wrote “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning” focusing on campaign planning and design. In the article, Reed describes the relationship between terminal and enabling campaigns. The terminal campaign “seeks war termination as an endstate.” James W. Reed defines an enabling campaign as achieving “some intermediate strategic objectives short of termination.” With this in mind, is Operation Enduring Freedom an effective enabling campaign to create conditions for the defeat of terrorism in the Central Command area of responsibility? The methodology for determining the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom is in two pieces. First, is the campaign adequate, feasible, and acceptable? This three part criteria is how joint doctrine evaluates effectiveness. Second, do the operational objectives nest within the strategic endstate? According to Reed, enabling campaigns help create the conditions for a terminal campaign. Therefore, a linkage between the operational objectives and the terminal campaign that achieves the strategic endstate is imperative. The Italian Campaign offers a historical case study of an enabling campaign. By comparing the Italian Campaign with Operation Enduring Freedom, the strengths and weakness of each generate lessons applicable to the future of the war on terrorism.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

On 11 September, the President of the United States spoke to the American people.

During the course of his address, he asked them to “stand their ground against this latest assault upon their democracy, their sovereignty, and their freedom.”<sup>1</sup> The tone of the President was firm as he stated, “You seek to throw our children and our children’s children into your form of terrorism and slavery. You have now attacked our own safety. You shall go no further.”<sup>2</sup> The president was Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the year was 1941. The address was radio broadcast, one of his fireside chats, in response to German unrestricted submarine warfare.<sup>3</sup> This address is often cited as the beginning of the undeclared war against Germany.<sup>4</sup> Fifty years later, President George W. Bush assured the American citizenry that he would use all available resources to find those who attacked World Trade Center.<sup>5</sup> Bush stated that the United States and all those who want global peace will stand united to “win the war against terrorism.”<sup>6</sup> Known later as the Bush Doctrine, the president saw “no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and

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<sup>1</sup>“Franklin D. Roosevelt’s September 11, 1941 Fireside Chat,” The Political Resource Page, available from [http://www.politicalresource.net/fdr's\\_fireside\\_chat\\_of\\_September\\_11\\_1941.html](http://www.politicalresource.net/fdr's_fireside_chat_of_September_11_1941.html), Internet, accessed 10 March 2003.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. President Roosevelt referenced five incidents of German submarine aggression. Two of the incidents involved American warships. In one case southeast of Greenland, two separate torpedo attacks were conducted against the destroyer USS Greer. The destroyer was delivering mail to Iceland at the time. As a result of the incident, Roosevelt authorized the military to shoot on sight any German or Italian vessels.

<sup>4</sup>“Museum of Tolerance Multimedia Learning Center,” Simon Wiesenthal Center, available from <http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/text/x22/xr2243.html>, Internet, accessed 10 March 2003.

<sup>5</sup>“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010911-16.html>, Internet, accessed 12 January 2003.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

those who harbor them.”<sup>7</sup> This doctrine formed the basis for Operation Enduring Freedom’s strategic endstate.

On 7 October 2001, Bush announced the first phase of the global war on terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom.<sup>8</sup> He dictated the theater strategic objectives when he ordered General Tommy Franks, Combatant Commander of Central Command to disrupt al Qaeda’s use of Afghanistan as a base of operations and to attack the Taliban military capability.<sup>9</sup> In terms of campaign design, a discussion concerning the relationship of enabling and terminal campaigns helps understanding how Operation Enduring Freedom supports the global war on terrorism. James W. Reed, in “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” examines campaign planning and design.<sup>10</sup> His article focused on how combatant commanders link military means to strategic aims. Reed stated that terminal campaign “seeks war termination as an endstate,” and enabling campaigns achieve “intermediate strategic objectives short of [war] termination.”<sup>11</sup> With this in mind, is Central Command’s execution of Operation Enduring Freedom an effective enabling campaign in support of the global war on terrorism? Answering this question is accomplished by establishing a doctrinal foundation. Subsequently, this foundation provides the framework used to analyze campaign effectiveness of both the World War II Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom. Doctrine, as outlined in military

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<sup>7</sup>Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 30.

<sup>8</sup>“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/2001/09/print/20010911-16.html>, Internet, accessed 12 January 2003.

<sup>9</sup>“Presidential Address to the Nation,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>, Internet, accessed 4 September 2002.

<sup>10</sup>James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” *Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting: DJMO Selected Readings Book Vol. II* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), L10-A-8. At the time of the publication of the article, Reed was the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. He had previously served as a strategic planner in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and earned a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

manuals and publications, provides a common point of understanding for the application of military force.

The doctrinal basis for enabling campaign is operational level planning guidance within Army and Joint Doctrine. FM 100-7 states that a combatant commander may divide the theater of war into theaters of operations. Each theater of operation either accomplishes or contributes to the accomplishment of the theater strategic objectives. Specifically, these subordinate campaigns achieve the strategic endstate or “establish conditions for further operations that lead to the specified end state.”<sup>12</sup> Enabling campaigns should only target vulnerabilities that support the objectives of the terminal campaign.<sup>13</sup> The Reed terminology is appropriate because neither FM 100-7 nor JP 5-0 makes a vernacular distinction between the two types of subordinate campaigns.

Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* provides the criteria used to evaluate the joint plan effectiveness. JP 5-0 specifies that joint operation plans are developed in compliance with the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability.<sup>14</sup> Adequacy determines whether the concept of operations satisfies the assigned mission. Verification of adequacy is by answering three questions. First, are operational planning assumptions consistent with strategic guidance? Any inconsistency between the theater strategic guidance and the operational planning assumptions is indicative that a plan that does not support the commander’s intent. Second, was the endstate altered during the course of the operation? Endstate alteration predicates a significant change in the subordinate unit’s task and purpose. Any change in the task and purpose of a subordinate unit is a potential shift away from the essential mission’s tasks. The

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<sup>12</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 4-16.

<sup>13</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), II-12.

<sup>14</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), I-13. The fourth criterion of compliance with joint doctrine is not addressed comparatively because the concept of joint doctrine was introduced after the historical case study.

result is a lack of focus and a dilution of effort within the theater. Finally, were the assigned achieved? The ultimate criterion is always if the mission is accomplished.<sup>15</sup>

Operational success is dependent upon an adequate plan with a feasible concept of support. Feasible plans accomplish assigned tasks with available resources. Verification of feasibility is also defined with three questions. First, is the operational level command resourced to provide required capabilities? If an anticipated capability is ineffectively exercised due to a lack of resources, the feasibility of the plan is in question. Second, has the operational level command developed an effective employment scheme? A sound employment scheme focuses sufficient combat power and sustainment stocks on the operational objective. If a force is too small to defeat the threat on the objective, the employment scheme is flawed. Similarly, if the force does not have the resources to consolidate its gains on the objective, the employment scheme is flawed. Third, does the plan provide flexibility by maintaining alternatives and reserves?<sup>16</sup> If a branch or sequel is required, resources should not prevent its execution.

An adequate concept of the operation supported by a feasible concept of support is only acceptable if it efficiently uses its resources to accomplish the mission. Acceptable plans achieve the objectives by avoiding excessive losses in personnel, materiel, and public opinion. Do the anticipated, quantifiable results outweigh the expenditure of resources and collateral damage? Prior to proceeding with the execution of the operation, a detailed estimate anticipated the conducted. Are the objectives of the operation also militarily and politically supportable?<sup>17</sup> Additionally, it is assured that the effectiveness of the plan is not counterbalanced by potential information operations or a public outcry. These criteria in conjunction with the elements of operational design form a doctrinal formula for the analysis of the Italian Campaign as well as Operation Enduring Freedom.

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid, I-13.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

The methodology for determining Operation Enduring Freedom's effectiveness of as an enabling campaign begins by providing a blueprint to help grasp the problem and the setting. The first chapter introduces the thesis question, defines the criteria for analysis, and provides the methodology of the monograph. Additionally, the principal sources of information are identified. At the end of chapter one, the primary research question is recognized, the breadth of the criteria is understood, and the framework of the monograph is known. With the blueprint in hand, argument construction moves forward with a doctrinal review and the defining of terms.

The second chapter lays the foundation on top of which all analysis is built. Army and Joint doctrine define the terminology relevant to campaign design and planning. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, defines the elements of operational design in terms of full spectrum campaign planning. Complimentary to FM 3-0, FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, discusses aspects of planning at the operational level of war.<sup>18</sup> Within Joint doctrine, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, and JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, provides direction for the planning and execution of campaigns and major operations. Therefore, the discussion of the linkage of theater strategy to a campaign plan is critical to the overall effectiveness of the campaign. At the end of chapter two, the elements of operational design and how they are used by the combatant commander are understood. With a foundation established, doctrine is used to analyze the Italian Campaign effectiveness.

Chapter three frames the concept of an effective enabling campaign. The Allies determined that an enabling campaign in Italy was necessary to create the conditions for terminal campaign in Northern Europe. The strategic setting is drawn from *The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino* by Martin Blumenson, *Grand Strategy*, volume V: *August 1943-*

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<sup>18</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), iii.

*September 1944* by John Ehrman, and *The Second World War* by Churchill.<sup>19</sup> The elements of operational design describe how Eisenhower and Alexander linked operational objectives to theater strategic objectives. Finally, the relationship between the Italian Campaign and the invasion of Northern Europe is analyzed using the joint doctrine criteria of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability. This analysis offers an understanding as to why the Italian Campaign was an effective enabling campaign. With the characteristics of an effective enabling campaign framed within the Italian Campaign complete, the focus of analysis turns to Operation Enduring Freedom.

Chapter four portrays Operation Enduring Freedom in terms of strategic setting, the elements of operational design, and the analysis using the joint doctrine criteria. The Presidential addresses following the attacks of 11 September, coupled with the National Security Strategy, provide the strategic setting. During hearings before the Congressional Armed Services Committees, Franks described the operational objectives of Central Command within the global construct of the war on terrorism.<sup>20</sup> Franks stated that nine lines of operation were being used to achieve the theater strategic objectives dictated to him by Bush. These nine lines of operation provide the operational objectives and most of the elements of operational design for Operation Enduring Freedom. Given, the pertinent elements of Operation Enduring Freedom's design, the joint doctrine criteria are applied to determine the effectiveness. At the end of chapter four, the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom is understood, and the information for comparative analysis between the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom is available.

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<sup>19</sup>*The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino* is a volume from the comprehensive official history of United States Army in World War II. Blumenson is a highly qualified military historian who served as the historical officer of the Third and Seventh Armies in Europe during World War II. He has written biographies on Eisenhower, Patton, and Clark. *Grand Strategy* is part of the equally comprehensive British military official history of World War II.

<sup>20</sup>“GEN Franks testimony to the Armed Services Committee,” Central Command, available from <http://www.centcom.mil/news/transcripts/20020227.htm>, Internet, accessed 4 September 2002.

Chapter five evaluates the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom as an enabling campaign based upon the synthesis of doctrine, historical case study, and recent operations. Based upon cumulative analysis, Operation Enduring Freedom is proven an effective enabling campaign. The synthesis focuses on the comparative nesting of the elements of operational design within the theater strategic objectives and satisfying the joint doctrine criteria. The one shortcoming of Operation Enduring Freedom is the absence of an identified terminal campaign. Within the final chapter, an argument is made that clear conflict termination guidance provides the purpose of the terminal campaign. By understanding the purpose of the future terminal campaign, the operational commander is capable of designing an effective enabling campaign. At the end of chapter five, the Operation Enduring Freedom's effectiveness as an enabling campaign is understood because the nested relationship of the elements of operational design are consistent with the Italian Campaign and because Operation Enduring Freedom meets joint doctrine criteria. This conclusion is achieved as each chapter builds a structural component required for the final synthesis.

In summary, chapter one provided the blueprint and the methodology for building the argument that Operation Enduring Freedom is an effective enabling campaign. The research question addresses the problem that the operational objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom do not lead directly to the strategic aim of defeating terrorist with global reach. The methodology is a campaign analysis of the World War II Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom using joint doctrine criteria in terms of the elements of operational design. Chapter one provides a simple outline of the argument and sets the stage for subsequent chapters to build upon. The next step in argument construction is laying the doctrinal foundation on top of which all future analysis is built.

## CHAPTER TWO

### DOCTRINAL REVIEW AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

Implicit to any analysis on the effectiveness of an enabling campaign is gaining an understanding of doctrine, terminology, and campaign planning. This chapter describes the commonalities and discrepancies between Army and Joint campaign planning doctrine. The purpose is to understand the cognitive tension that exists from national strategic aims to subordinate campaigns at the operational level.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, it is the linkage of operational objectives to strategic aims that determine if a campaign is terminal, enabling, or irrelevant. In developing campaign plans, commanders use the elements of operational design to visualize the mission.<sup>2</sup> An orderly doctrinal presentation of facts and conclusions facilitates analysis using the joint doctrine. Throughout this chapter, the terminology of campaign planning is defined in accordance with current doctrine. The underlying purpose is the visualization of campaign design and a common perspective of campaign planning.

A common doctrinal perspective begins with an understanding of the operational level of war. While there are some differences in the language, Army and Joint doctrine are in basic agreement. According to FM 3-0, the operational level of war encompasses campaigns and major operations undertaken to “accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations (AO).”<sup>3</sup> As the link between the tactical and strategic levels of war, operational art focuses on the “design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations,

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<sup>1</sup>Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 65. Cognitive tension is the “inevitable tension between tactical objectives, which orient the fighting formations at any level, and the operational and strategic aim, which directs the system as a whole.”

<sup>2</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-6.

<sup>3</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 2-2.

and battles.”<sup>4</sup> Similarly, JP 5-0 defines operational art as the setting of operational objectives required to achieve strategic objectives. The sequencing of events to achieve the operational objectives depends upon the initiating of actions and the application of resources to create the required conditions.<sup>5</sup> The context is consistent with the Army doctrine of design, organization, integration, and conduct. Both Army and Joint doctrine summarize the operational level of war as “providing the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.”<sup>6</sup> The linkage of operational objectives and theater strategic objectives in the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom are further discussed in chapters three and four. The mapping of operational objectives to the strategic objectives is a critical step in determining whether the campaign is enabling or terminal. To further define the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom, it is necessary to understand the distinction between campaigns and major operations.

The differences between campaigns and major operations are scoped in terms of the mission and the role of subordinate units. Both FM 3-0 and JP 5-0 define a campaign as a “related series of military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given space and time.”<sup>7</sup> FM 100-7 divides campaigns into two categories, theater and subordinate campaigns. Theater campaigns are focused on national strategic objectives. Conversely, subordinate campaigns are focused on theater strategic objectives.<sup>8</sup> Similar to campaigns, major operations accomplish either operation or strategic objectives. The difference

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), GL-3.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 2-2.

<sup>8</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 4-3.

is that major operations accomplish the objectives through a series of tactical actions.<sup>9</sup>

Unfortunately, joint doctrine does not provide a clear definition for major operations. For the purposes of clarity, the Army definition of major operations is used. In chapters three and four, a conclusion is reached that both the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom are subordinate campaigns. This determination is critical to the mapping of operational objectives and strategic objectives to determine terminal and enabling campaigns. Analysis in later chapters maps the linkage of operational and strategic objectives using specific elements of operational design.

The commander uses the elements of operational design as defined in FM 3-0 to visualize the campaign.<sup>10</sup> While JP 5-00.1 disdains providing a “prescriptive” list of elements, it does not refrain from specifying operational concepts that must be addressed.<sup>11</sup> Given all the options, FM 3-0 provides the most concise and most inclusive list of elements. Of the nine elements, six are used to present primary source information for further analysis regarding the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom in chapters three and four, respectively. Before moving on to those campaigns, the meaning and purpose of those elements needs defining.

Arguably the most important element of operational design, the concept of center of gravity is an analytical tool to determine critical capabilities and vulnerabilities.<sup>12</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, a milestone figure in the development of military strategy, defined the center of

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<sup>9</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 2-2.

<sup>10</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-6 to 5-12. The nine elements in FM 3-0 are end state and military conditions, center of gravity, decisive points and objectives, lines of operation, culminating point, operational reach/approach/pause, simultaneous and sequential operations, linear and nonlinear operations, and tempo.

<sup>11</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), II-12.

<sup>12</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 3-1.

gravity as “the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends.”<sup>13</sup> The destruction of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct course of action to victory.<sup>14</sup> Just as important as attacking the center of gravity is the protection of the friendly center of gravity. Clausewitz stated the three most likely centers of gravity of a nation state were its military, its capital, and its alliance with a more powerful nation.<sup>15</sup> In chapter three, historical sources are used to identify the Axis center of gravity in World War II was Nazi Germany. Modern doctrine expands the idea of center of gravity to include complex and abstract facets of national existence.<sup>16</sup> In situations where the center of gravity is unassailable to direct action, the alternative is indirect action. The indirect approach targets decisive points and exploits vulnerabilities.<sup>17</sup> As enabling campaigns, the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom are operational models of the indirect approach. As an indirect approach, each campaign’s mission should have an effect on a decisive point or vulnerability with a direct link to the enemy center of gravity.

Decisive points are not centers of gravity, they are critical geographical locations or enabling systems that protect the center of gravity.<sup>18</sup> The seizure, occupation, or destruction of a point provides the commander a “marked advantage over an enemy.”<sup>19</sup> Typically, there are more decisive points within an area of operations than are securable. Commanders and staff shape the

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<sup>13</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 595.

<sup>14</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-7.

<sup>15</sup>Clausewitz, 596.

<sup>16</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 3-1. Center of gravity analysis may identify a center of gravity which is not militarily targetable. The examples used in doctrine are national will and solidarity. In the center of gravity analysis cited later, the al Qaeda center of gravity is a hatred of apostasy. It is assumed that hatred of apostasy falls in the category of centers of gravity that are not militarily targetable.

<sup>17</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), II-14.

<sup>18</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-7.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

campaign by selecting decisive points that are either geographic or enemy force oriented.<sup>20</sup> Once a decisive point is selected for action, it is defined as an objective.<sup>21</sup> Doctrinally, a line of operation focuses on the seizure of decisive points. Through sequencing or simultaneous action, the seizure of decisive points leads to enhanced freedom of movement, retention of the initiative, and ultimate victory against the center of gravity.<sup>22</sup> The Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom are lines of operation within their broader conflicts. The Italian Campaign's purpose was to create the conditions for the overthrow of the fascist Italian government and to fix German forces in Italy. These two decisive points were critical requirements that supported the Axis center of gravity, Nazi Germany. Similarly, Operation Enduring Freedom's purpose was to destroy the al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban leadership. These two decisive points were critical requirements that supported the al Qaeda center of gravity in Afghanistan, their remote mountain strongholds.<sup>23</sup> Within each of those campaigns, additional subordinate lines of operations were developed targeting decisive points that enabled or protected the primary objectives. In Operation Enduring Freedom Franks used logical lines of operations.

In an environment where geographic location and enabling systems are not decisive, logical lines of operations are developed.<sup>24</sup> Logical lines of operation use a cause and effect framework to resource military assets to support operations.<sup>25</sup> Logical lines of operation are most suited for stability and support operations.<sup>26</sup> The original intent of logical lines of operation was to support non-combat operations. However, General Tommy Franks has effectively used logical

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 3-1.

<sup>23</sup>Al Qaeda center of gravity analysis is conducted more in depth in chapter four.

<sup>24</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 3-1.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

lines of operation to invoke flexibility into combat operations in Afghanistan. Logical lines of operation facilitate decentralized execution in an environment devoid of contiguous operational maneuver. The use of multiple lines of operation increases flexibility and decreases vulnerability. Conversely, multiple lines of operations dilute the main effort and increase the demand on resources. The overextension of assets without a sufficient support system may lead to force culmination.

Joint doctrine provides the basic definition of culminating point as the “point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operation.”<sup>27</sup> In the offensive, the attacking force culminates when it no longer has the combat power or resources to maintain its momentum.<sup>28</sup> Beyond the culminating point, the attacker risks a decisive defeat in the face of a counterattack. In a stability or support operation, the culminating point is more ambiguous. A change in the national character or an event with political implications (an election, a coup, or a national tragedy) may change the strategic aims and lead to a culmination point.<sup>29</sup> During the Italian Campaign, loss of sea lines of communications would have prevented effective sustainment of forces resulting in campaign culmination. By understanding the conditions causing culmination, an informed analysis is possible in determining operational approach.

Operational approach is either direct or indirect.<sup>30</sup> As previously stated, direct attacks against the enemy center of gravity is the quickest route to victory. There is a difference of guidance between Army and Joint doctrine on the preferred type of operational approach. Joint doctrine specifies, “to the extent possible, JFCs [joint force commanders] attack adversary centers

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<sup>27</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), II-18.

<sup>28</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-9.

<sup>29</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), II-18.

<sup>30</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), II-12.

of gravity directly.”<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, Army doctrine states that “when possible, commanders choose an indirect approach: they maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and degrade enemy capabilities; they refuse combat when the situation is unfavorable or the outcome does not significantly affect the operations.”<sup>32</sup> In the event that the center of gravity is too well defended or unassailable due to its complex nature, an indirect operational approach is used. In World War II, the United States and Great Britain knew they did not have the combat power to conduct a direct assault on “Fortress Europe.” Instead, they choose a series of enabling campaigns through Africa and Italy. The Allies used an indirect operational approach focused on objectives (decisive points) that would ultimately create the conditions for an assault on a vulnerable center of gravity, Nazi Germany.<sup>33</sup> Because the al Qaeda center of gravity within Afghanistan was different from their center of gravity within the Central Command area of responsibility, Franks adopted an indirect approach for Operation Enduring Freedom. The sequencing of indirect operations is an effective way of attacking the vulnerabilities of the enemy.

The sequencing of operations is dependent upon two main factors. The first is the order that objectives need to be achieved to create the conditions for subsequent actions. The second is the availability of resources. An example is the availability of assault shipping during World War II. In Europe during 1943, the Allies did not have the assault shipping to conduct two simultaneous amphibious landings at a level above corps. The lack of assault ships dictated sequential amphibious landings. A second order effect was that sealift assets were pulled from enabling theaters of operation like Italy to support decisive operations in northern France. It is effective sequencing of tasks that demonstrate the artistry of the operational commander. The elements of operational design assist the commander in visualizing the conditions required to

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-10.

<sup>33</sup>Department of Defense Joint Publication JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), II-13.

meet the intent of the next higher command. Through visualization, the operational commander understands the strategic objectives and translates them into tasks and underlying conditions used to issue planning guidance for the campaign.

In summary, this chapter established the doctrinal linkage of national strategic aims to fundamental principles of campaign planning. The elements of operational design are a doctrinal tool available to the commander to assist in visualizing requirements within the campaign. With an understanding of the elements of operational design, a comparison of the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom is possible. In the next two chapters, the elements of operational design are discussed for the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom. The elements of operational design provide the vision of the commander within his respective campaign plan. It is the evaluation of the campaign plan, as it exists within the vision and intent of the commander using the criteria of adequate, feasible, and acceptable that is the basis for determining the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom as an enabling campaign.

## CHAPTER THREE

### ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

This chapter provides a case study of the 1943 Italian Campaign as an effective enabling campaign for comparative purposes. Using the elements of operational design to present facts and conclusions, Italian Campaign effectiveness is evaluated by the joint doctrine criteria of adequate, feasible, and acceptable. In the final synthesis of doctrine, history, and recent operations, the Italian Campaign case study demonstrates a historic relationship between strategic endstate and operational objectives indicative of an enabling campaign. The detailed examination of the Italian Campaign's effectiveness uncovers lessons, positive and negative, applicable to current operations.

In December 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met to map the grand strategy of the Anglo-American alliance during the American-British Conference (ABC). In the conference's final report, the United States and British chiefs of staff determined that the defeat of Germany was the key to victory in World War II during<sup>1</sup> Since Germany was the dominant member of the Axis Powers, it was concluded that Europe was the decisive theater.<sup>2</sup> The ABC also laid the foundation for future operations in the Mediterranean. The Southern European seaboard and North African are specifically mentioned as key terrain vulnerable to Allied attack.<sup>3</sup> During the course of the Washington War Conference, Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed upon an indirect approach.<sup>4</sup> Churchill saw the strategic advantages of Operation Torch as reducing the strain of the war on Russia, opening the Mediterranean, and creating the conditions for invasion of

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<sup>1</sup>“American-British Strategy,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum, available from <http://www.fdr.library.marist.edu>, Internet, accessed on 20 October 2002.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>“American-British Strategy,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum, available from <http://www.fdr.library.marist.edu>, Internet, accessed on 20 October 2002.

<sup>4</sup>Churchill, *Memoirs of the Second World War*, 527.

continental Europe.<sup>5</sup> Although Stalin agreed with Churchill that there was a strategic advantage in opening a secondary theater of operations in the Mediterranean, Stalin believed that the terminal campaign in the decisive area of operations, northern Europe, should begin at the earliest opportunity.<sup>6</sup> With Stalin's tepid approval, Operation Torch opened a second theater of operations against German forces. The Allies would conduct their landing sequentially, first in the Mediterranean and then across the channel.

The sequential nature of operations in the Mediterranean would ultimately lead to the Italian Campaign. As victory in North Africa became evident, the civilian and military leadership of the Allies grappled with the nature of subsequent operations. From the British perspective, the next logical step was the seizure of Sicily.<sup>7</sup> The occupation of Sicily was critical in order to secure the lines of communication, reduce pressure on the eastern front, and increase pressure on the Italian government.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) directed General Dwight D. Eisenhower to plan an exploitation following Sicily's seizure with theater strategic objectives of eliminating Italy from the war and fixing the maximum number of German forces.<sup>9</sup>

In August 1943, General Marshall informed Eisenhower that sufficient troops were deployed in the Mediterranean to accomplish all theater strategic objectives. The CCS report from the Quadrant Conference envisioned operations in three phases: the first phase was the elimination of Italy from the war and the establishment of air bases in the Rome area, the second phase was the seizure of Sardinia and Corsica, the third phase was the fixing of German forces in

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol 4: *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 480.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, 678.

<sup>8</sup>James M. Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 319.

<sup>9</sup>Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol 4: *The Hinge of Fate*, 810.

Italy to create the conditions for Overlord and Anvil.<sup>10</sup> Eisenhower and Alexander approved the final scheme of maneuver for the landing on mainland Italy on 23 August 1943. They agreed that Operation Avalanche's landing at Salerno by the Fifth Army was the decisive operation and Operation Baytown's landing on Calabria by the Eighth Army was shaping operation.<sup>11</sup> Salerno was selected because it was within the range of fighter coverage and it had a twenty-mile long beach with favorable gradients.<sup>12</sup> A successful lodgment at Salerno brought the ports of Naples and airfields of Foggia within the operational reach of 15th Army Group. Joint doctrine criterion of adequacy examines the Italian Campaign in three parts. First, were the planning assumptions of the Fifth Army are consistent with 15th Army Group? Second, was the desired endstate of the campaign altered from the original purpose? And third, did the campaign achieve all its assigned objectives? The weighting of each subsequent question increases and the cumulative result is a measure of adequacy of the 15th Army Group's Italian Campaign.

The dispersed nature of the 15th Army Group made integrated planning and assumption deconfliction difficult.<sup>13</sup> Alexander was the overall ground commander, but planning responsibilities were delegated to Fifth Army and Eight Army. Planning integration was conducted in a series of conferences during late August and early September 1943.<sup>14</sup> The planning conferences provided the senior commanders an opportunity to discuss facts, constraints, and assumptions. During these conferences, Fifth Army discovered that planning assumptions on available assault ships and assigned units were invalid. The availability of assault ships was complicated because the number of sealift assets available was constantly changing due to enemy engagement, sea conditions, and maintenance. The availability of landing craft was

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<sup>10</sup>John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, vol. V, *August 1943-September 1944* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 9.

<sup>11</sup>Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 179.

<sup>12</sup>Alexander, 113.

<sup>13</sup>Blumenson, 37.

<sup>14</sup>Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 179-181.

further complicated by the near simultaneous execution of Avalanche and Baytown. The Fifth Army had started with the assumption that four divisions would land during the initial assault. Ultimately, Fifth Army had only enough landing craft for three divisions in its initial assault.<sup>15</sup> Fifth Army was also surprised by task organization changes. It was originally assumed that 15th Army Group would assign the American VI Corps, the British X Corps, and the American 82d Airborne Division to Fifth Army for Operation Avalanche. In early September 1943, the 82d Airborne was taken out of the Fifth Army task organization for a possible airdrop on Rome.<sup>16</sup> The task organization change left Clark without a force to seize key bridges to block massing German reinforcements. Clark overcame incorrect planning assumptions because time was available to institute branch plans. The overall plan remained tenable due to the assumptions that were valid. 15th Army Group and Fifth Army shared two valid assumptions. First, the Allies would have sea and air superiority. As anticipated, the ship convoys assembled off the beach of Salerno without being interdicted. Fighter coverage operating at the far end of its operating range also proved a key force multiplier. Second, the Italians would offer only passive resistance. The Italian forces did not participate in the Fifth Army area of operations during Avalanche. Close coordination between 15th Army Group and Fifth Army was critical during Operation Avalanche. The coordination between the two headquarters allowed planners to overcome invalid assumptions prior to the beginning of operations.

Besides a common understanding of planning assumptions, the adequacy of a campaign plan is measured by an unchanging endstate and the achievement of objectives. By the middle of January 1945, 15th Army Group achieved all of its original objectives, and German units in Italy could not effectively influence the course of operations in northern Europe.<sup>17</sup> The endstate

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<sup>15</sup>Blumenson, 39.

<sup>16</sup>Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 181.

<sup>17</sup>Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., *The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Cassino to the Alps* (US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, 1977), 437.

envisioned by Marshall and the CCS was achieved. However, plans were developed for a spring offensive in Italy.<sup>18</sup> The military rationale for an offensive in the Italian AO was the possible existence of a “National Redoubt.” The “National Redoubt” was supposedly an area in the Alpine regions of Germany that Hitler and his fanatical supporters could occupy and defend for a protracted period.<sup>19</sup> By advancing to the Brenner Pass, the Allies would isolate German forces in northwest Italy and offer the opportunity for early engagement of the “National Redoubt” before the bulk of the defenses were established. The British also had a political rationale for a spring offensive in Italy. The seizure of the Italian ports of Trieste, Fiume, and Pola would preempt Yugoslavian ambition in the area. If the ports fell to the communist partisans, the creation of Russian dominated naval bases was conceivable.<sup>20</sup> The cumulative result was the endstate and theater strategic objectives were changed based upon unconfirmed intelligence and post-war ambitions.

The Italian Campaign was adequate because it successfully answered the three required questions. First, most of the assumption held by Fifth Army mirrored 15th Army Group. Although there were some isolated inconsistencies, the technique of consolidated planning conferences provided enough time for branch plan development and execution mitigating any detrimental effect. Second, the Italian Campaign desired endstate was not altered until after culmination the Northern European German army. Because the endstate was already achieved, operations initiated after January 1945 pursued an endstate incompatible with the original intent. This point is a lesson learned and is discussed further in chapter five. Finally, the campaign achieved all its assigned objectives. At the critical points of Operation Overlord and the culmination of the Northern European German army, the Italian Campaign accomplished its objectives. The Italian Campaign demonstrated its adequacy by demonstrating that assumptions

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid, 444.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, 443.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid, 444.

were consistent, the endstate did not change in relation to the terminal campaign, and all objectives were achieved. The second Joint Doctrine criteria, feasibility, is also analyzed in three parts. First, are sufficient resources available to conduct the campaign? Second, was an effective employment scheme utilized? Finally, was the campaign flexible? The first question is weighted over the latter two questions.

The essential component of feasibility is the availability of sufficient resources to conduct the campaign. As the senior civilian and military leadership struggled to define the objectives of the Italian Campaign in 1945, they faced the same feasibility issues as in 1943. As an enabling campaign, the Italian area of operations did not have a priority of resources.<sup>21</sup> In December 1943, the Mediterranean component commanders were ordered to send seven divisions, 170 bombers, and the bulk of available sealift assets to England for Overlord.<sup>22</sup> This reduction in available resources did not alter the theater strategic objectives assigned to the commanders in the area of operations. The loss of resources also did not alter the commander's employment scheme.

Second component of feasibility is an effective employment scheme. In an attempt to achieve the theater strategic objectives, Eisenhower and Alexander issued planning guidance for an amphibious landing at Anzio to turn the German defenses in the vicinity of Rome.<sup>23</sup> The Allies conducted a series of attacks along the breadth of the Gustav line designed to draw German forces away from the Anzio landing. After the landing, the same units conducting the supporting attacks would then attempt a penetration and link up with the forces at Anzio.<sup>24</sup> The initial array of supporting attacks was effective in causing the Germans to reinforce the Gustav line. Unfortunately, the end effect was a strengthened German defense prior to the penetration phase of the operation. The methodical employment of forces at Anzio allowed the Germans to encircle

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<sup>21</sup>Blumenson, 181.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid, 293.

<sup>24</sup>Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 271.

the lodgment. The ill fated landing would precipitate a winter offensive against the Gustav line centered upon the Monte Cassino massif to relieve the isolated forces. The ineffective scheme of maneuver would cost the Allies men and material.

The final component of a feasible campaign is flexibility. The ability to seamlessly shifting the main effort and to effectively use reserves demonstrates flexibility. After the Anzio landing, the 15th Army Group, specifically the Fifth Army, was required to penetrate and relieve the beleaguered VI Corps. The only tenable axis of advance for a winter offensive was through the Liri Valley and the heart of the German Gustav Line. The friendly, enemy, and environmental conditions forced the course of action of the main effort. Choke points on the Monte Cassino massif and in the Liri Valley produced company and battalion sized maneuver corridors that mitigated the use of reserves. The Anzio landing led directly to the absence of flexibility because the main effort could not shift from the Liri Valley.

The Italian Campaign was feasible, but the scheme of maneuver endangered the success of the campaign. The Italian Campaign was allocated sufficient resources to accomplish the objectives of eliminating Italy from the war and fixing the maximum number of German forces. However, the scheme of maneuver focused on the destruction of German forces in Italy. Accentuating the incompatibility between the scheme of maneuver and objectives are poorly conceived operations. For example, the winter amphibious operation at Anzio negated Allied flexibility. In spite of the scheme of maneuver, the Italian Campaign was resourced to accomplish its original objectives and was, therefore, feasible.

Acceptability is the third criteria analyzing the Italian Campaign. Acceptability is addressed in three parts. First, did the quantifiable results of the Italian Campaign outweigh the expenditure of resources and collateral damage? Second, did the Italian Campaign abide by the law of war? Finally, were the Italian Campaign operational objectives politically and militarily supportable? Although the Italian Campaign theater strategic objectives created the conditions for the invasion of Northern Europe, the course of action selected necessitated excessive loss of

men and equipment.<sup>25</sup> The Italian Campaign was a necessary element of the Allied grand strategy in World War II Europe. At the strategic level, resources were allocated to the Italian Campaign for the proposed endstate of removing Italy from the war and fixing German forces. However, Eisenhower wanted a decisive outcome based upon the sheer magnitude of resources employed. In a resource constrained environment, Eisenhower and later Alexander directed a resource intensive course of action based upon the forces available versus the theater strategic objectives assigned. The conclusion is the loss of men and equipment was excessive in terms of the campaign achievements.

As the Allies used their military superiority to defeat the belts of the German defense, the weight of the effort sometimes ran opposed to the scales of military law. The 1940 version of the Department of the Army Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, defines military necessity as “subject to the principles of humanity and chivalry, a belligerent is justified in apply any amount and any kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life and money.”<sup>26</sup> The reference to humanity and chivalry were interpreted to mean that even an attack aimed at the militarily weakening of the enemy must not cause harm to civilians or civilian objects that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. A famous example of military necessity being improperly used is the destruction of The Abbey of Monte Cassino. St. Benedict founded the Abbey of Monte Cassino in the sixth century on key terrain overlooking the road from Naples to Rome. Despite being one of only two locations specifically cited as requiring protection, Alexander approved the destruction of the abbey based upon the possible psychological benefits to friendly troops. The misapplication of force was generally overlooked because the will of the people at home was focused on seizing terrain.

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<sup>25</sup>Carlo D'Este, “The Italian Campaign: A 50 Year Perspective,” in *1943: The Beginning of the End*, ed Paul D. Dickson (Waterloo: LCMSDS, 1995, 73.

<sup>26</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1940), 1.

An acceptable Italian Campaign required public and military support. The Italian Campaign appeased the public desire to see the war brought to continental Europe. It was the first breach of fortress Europe. The general approval of the Italian Campaign overshadowed any debate on the attrition-based concept adopted by Eisenhower. The Italian campaign accounted for approximately forty percent of American casualties for the entire duration of World War II. The high casualty rate and the dubious chances of German investment from the south did not deter military leaders. Aggressive offensive operations continued on the Italian peninsula until the capitulation of Germany.

In summary, historical facts support the conclusion that the Italian Campaign was an enabling campaign. If Germany was the center of gravity, the terminal campaign endstate must include a defeated Germany. The discussion and agreements that span the period from the Washington Conference to the Casablanca Conference are centered upon the establishment of a secondary theater to help create the conditions for the invasion of northern Europe. Specifically, at the Casablanca Conference, a primary objective of the Italian Campaign was to fix German forces to prevent their introduction against Operation Overlord. Referring back to Reed for the definition of an enabling campaign, an enabling campaign achieves some intermediate strategic objectives short of termination and only targets vulnerabilities that support the objectives of the terminal campaign. The Italian Campaign fulfills both of those qualifications. With the Italian Campaign proven as an enabling campaign, a comparative process for the purpose of validating Operation Enduring Freedom as an enabling campaign may begin.

The comparison of the Italian Campaign to Operation Enduring Freedom goes beyond just the substantiated conclusion that it was or was not an enabling campaign. A secondary intent is to apply lessons learned from the Italian Campaign to Operation Enduring Freedom. Therefore, this chapter also evaluated the effectiveness of the Italian Campaign. Through the use of elements of operational design and the joint doctrine criteria of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability, the strengths and weaknesses of the Italian Campaign were identified. The

strengths of the Italian Campaign were a definite nesting within the Allied grand strategy. The limited objectives of the Italian Campaign were consistent with its role in the Mediterranean theater. It was properly resourced based upon those limited objectives. The weakness of the Italian Campaign was the ability of the operational commander to translate theater strategic objectives into operational objectives. Eisenhower did not focus on the objectives as presented at the Casablanca Conference. Instead, Eisenhower focused on the capability of the force under his command and its potential effect on the enemy. As a result, the Italian Campaign degenerated into an attrition-based operation.<sup>27</sup> Eisenhower accentuated this downward spiral in effectiveness when he stated that he wanted the outcome of the Italian Campaign based upon the sheer magnitude to resources brought to bear. At a point when German forces in Italy were unable to influence the final outcome of the war, the Allies continued to conduct offensive operations. And, they continued to consume people and equipment for marginal gains at best. The Italian Campaign was an effective enabling campaign, but there was a considerable cost. The principle determination for making that judgment is the creation of conditions for a successful terminal campaign. At the time of the Normandy invasion, the Allies had eliminated Italy from the war, had occupied Rome, and had fixed five German corps.<sup>28</sup> Although the endstate and theater strategic objectives would change, at the critical point of initiation of the terminal campaign, the Italian Campaign had achieved its mission. The direct correlation of success in the enabling campaign of Italy to the success in the terminal campaign of Northern France is the measure of effectiveness expected in Operation Enduring Freedom.

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<sup>27</sup>Blumenson, 175.

<sup>28</sup>Fisher, 444.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

On 7 October 2001, President Bush informed the American public that he had ordered the military to attack al Qaeda terrorist camps and Taliban military installations.<sup>1</sup> In this chapter, Operation Enduring Freedom is demonstrated as an effective enabling campaign in the war on terrorism. The proof lies in the grand strategy of war on terrorism as outlined in critical national policy documents and the nesting of Operation Enduring Freedom within derived conflict termination guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense. The elements of operational design provide the setting and facts later analyzed using the joint doctrine criteria of adequate, feasible, and acceptable determining the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom as an enabling campaign. The detailed examination of the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom is important to uncovering lessons that are applicable to future operations.

During the 7 October address, Bush emphasized that Operation Enduring Freedom was only the first phase in the broader war on terrorism. Bush outlined two strategic aims of the war on terrorism during his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002.<sup>2</sup> The first aim is the destruction of terrorist camps, the disruption of terrorist plans, and the judgment of terrorist in a court of law. The second aim is the prevention of terrorists and rogue regimes from threatening the United States and its allies with weapons of mass destruction.<sup>3</sup> Published in September 2002, the National Security Strategy (NSS) provided a general methodology for winning the war on

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<sup>1</sup>“Presidential Address to the Nation,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>, Internet, accessed 4 September 2002.

<sup>2</sup>“President Delivers State of the Union Address,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html>, Internet, accessed 13 September 2002.

<sup>3</sup>“Presidential Address to the Nation,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>, Internet, accessed 4 September 2002.

terrorism.<sup>4</sup> The NSS states the first priority of the war on terrorism is “to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership: command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.”<sup>5</sup> The president’s NSS methodology has three parts based upon the military, information, and diplomatic sources of power. First, identify and destroy threats, preemptively if possible, before they reach our national boundaries. Second, use information operations to attack the underlying conditions that promote terrorism. Third, convince or compel foreign nations to deny further sponsorship, support, or sanctuary to terrorist.<sup>6</sup> The desired endstate of the war on terrorism is protecting national security.<sup>7</sup> The three parts of the methodology translate into three lines of operation in the war on terrorism. It is no longer sufficient to secure our borders and stand guard over our vital national interests. The war on terrorism is a proactive campaign to identify and destroy threats before they can endanger the interests of the United States. The military component of the war on terrorism described in the NSS is a reactive action against existing threats. The informational and diplomatic components are proactive initiatives that attack the underlying conditions preventing the development of future threats. If the war on terrorism is a proactive campaign, the decisive component is not militaristic. Military actions eliminate existing threats but do not interrupt the cycle of terrorism. Unfortunately, informational and diplomatic initiatives are longer term solutions. In the interim, military action is required to protect American national security against current and developing threats.

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<sup>4</sup>George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, September 2002), 5.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, 6.

<sup>7</sup>“President Delivers State of the Union Address,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html>, Internet, accessed 13 September 2002.

The threat center of gravity identified during the state of the union address in 2002 is the “axis of evil.”<sup>8</sup> The “axis of evil” consists of rogue states and their terrorist allies that potentially threaten the peace of the world.<sup>9</sup> Bush’s identification of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq by name is an inclusive, not exclusive, list of nations within the axis of evil. Bush describes the axis of evil as repressive nations and non-state organizations seeking weapons of mass destruction in order to attack countries with dissimilar ideologies. The axis of evil is a complex system of association and support. The despotic nature of these regimes and organizations isolates them and, as a byproduct, reduces dependence on outside resources, often at the expense of the indigenous population. There is not a known single point of dependence within the axis of evil. Without an assailable center of gravity, the planning of a terminal campaign is not currently possible.

Since a direct approach using a terminal campaign is not possible, the war on terrorism is a series of indirect enabling campaigns.<sup>10</sup> Each enabling campaign targets decisive points and vulnerabilities in the axis of evil. Although the Taliban was not attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction capability, they did offer sanctuary to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda used Afghanistan as a base of operations while it attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction and train terrorists.<sup>11</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom is the first example of an indirect military enabling campaign targeting a decisive point in the war on terrorism.

Military action is not always required to attack a decisive point. Given Bush’s three lines of operation, only one depends upon the use of the military. The other two lines of operation rely primarily upon the use of diplomatic, informational, and economic actions. Conceivably, military action may inflame the underlying causes of terrorism. It is through the integrated use of all the

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, September 2002), 6.

<sup>11</sup>“Al-Qa’ida (the Base),” Institute for Counter-Terrorism, available from [http://www.ict.org.il/inter\\_ter/orgdet.cfm](http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm), Internet, accessed 14 March 2003.

elements of power that Bush plans to conduct a simultaneous campaign against multiple decisive points. Some decisive points will require military action. The repressive governments of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran are undeterred in the face of diplomatic and economic pressure. Given the current levels of force structure and training, sequential enabling campaigns are required in these three countries.<sup>12</sup> Conversely, the American military can execute simultaneous small scale contingency operations.

Afghanistan, an example of a country with a limited military capability, is a repressive nation harboring non-state organizations with intentions to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom after a definitive link was established between al Qaeda and Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup> Bush stated the intent of the operation was “to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations” and to bring terrorist to justice.<sup>14</sup> It is the responsibility of General Tommy Franks commander of Central Command to translate the president’s intent into operational objectives. As commander of Central Command (USCENTCOM), Franks has the responsibility to promote regional stability, ensure the uninterrupted flow of resources, maintain freedom of navigation, protect American citizens and property, and promote the security of regional allies within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).<sup>15</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom is an example of a military action in support of those responsibilities. Until the creation of Task Force 180 in June 2002, Franks was

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<sup>12</sup>Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington DC: GPO, 2002), 21.

<sup>13</sup>Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 40.

<sup>14</sup>“Presidential Address to the Nation,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>, Internet, accessed 4 September 2002.

<sup>15</sup>“Statement of General R. Franks Commander in Chief US Central Command,” United States Senate, available from [http://www.senate.gov/~armed\\_services/statemnt/2001/010322tf.pdf](http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2001/010322tf.pdf), Internet, accessed on 10 March 2003. The Central Command area of responsibility includes the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, the northern Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, central Asia, and south Asia.

also in the unique position of establishing theater strategic objectives within the AOR and establishing operational objectives for Enduring Freedom.<sup>16</sup>

Franks stated in late October 2001 that the USCENTCOM mission in Operation Enduring Freedom was the destruction of the al Qaeda terrorist network and the removal of the Taliban leadership.<sup>17</sup> The desired endstate was the removal of the Taliban leadership, disrupt al Qaeda use of Afghanistan as training and staging base, avert a humanitarian disaster, and enhance the stability of the new government. To achieve the endstate, Franks required a concept that was capable of reaching al Qaeda's center of gravity.

The enemy center of gravity in Operation Enduring Freedom was the remote strongholds in the ungoverned and inaccessible areas of Afghanistan. This conclusion is based upon the observations of two military leaders and anecdotal observations. Major General Franklin L Hagenbeck identified the caves in the remote mountains of Afghanistan as the center of gravity.<sup>18</sup> Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf supports his conclusion. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Yousaf was responsible for the planning of Afghan operations. In discussing the elements required for armed resistance to succeed, Yousaf identified the requirement of a secure operational base where forces could refit and rest as essential to success.<sup>19</sup> As an example, Yousaf describes a mountain base of operation employed by an Afghan guerrilla leader. It maximized the use of caves to provide cover and concealment from aerial bombardment and utilized a steep ridge to prevent

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<sup>16</sup>“Operation Enduring Freedom Chain of Command,” Center for Defense Information, available from <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/OEFcommand-pr.cfm>, Internet, accessed on 10 March 2003. Task Force 180 established LTG Dan K. McNeill as the joint force commander in Afghanistan. The establishment of TF 180 marks the limit of research for this monograph.

<sup>17</sup>“Press Conference with General Tommy Franks,” US Central Command, available from [http://www.centcom.mil/news/press\\_briefings/fran1030.html](http://www.centcom.mil/news/press_briefings/fran1030.html), Internet, accessed on 4 September 2002.

<sup>18</sup>Robert H. McElroy, ed. Patricia Slayden Hollis, “Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda,” *Field Artillery* September-October 2002, 7. MG Hagenbeck was the commanding officer of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division during Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda was a 17 day major operation embedded in Operation Enduring Freedom during February and March 2002.

<sup>19</sup>Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan: The Bear Trap* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001), 64.

Soviet ground attack.<sup>20</sup> This conclusion contradicts the analysis conducted by U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II.<sup>21</sup> Echevarria contends that the al Qaeda center of gravity is their “hatred of apostasy.”<sup>22</sup> While his analysis is sound in reference to the global network of al Qaeda, Operation Enduring Freedom only encompassed Afghanistan. Because of the difficulty of mounting an operation into the land locked and foreboding environment that is Afghanistan, the American military response to previous al Qaeda provocations was the firing of cruise missiles.<sup>23</sup> The al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, therefore, is able to operate without fear of interdiction as long as the remote strongholds exist. The al Qaeda critical vulnerability was the Taliban leadership. A strong central government in Afghanistan might attempt to regain control of the ungoverned regions. The obvious vulnerability of the Taliban became one of the focal points for Franks when he developed his logical lines of operation.<sup>24</sup>

Franks established nine logical lines of operation for Operation Enduring Freedom.<sup>25</sup> Each line of operation was focused upon a decisive point within Afghanistan, and linked to the endstate. The key decisive points were the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership, the Taliban military, the al Qaeda training bases, and the road network. Within the repressive structure of the Afghan government, the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership controlled policy. The logical lines of operations of destroying the Taliban military, operational fires, direct attack of the leadership of

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid, 123.

<sup>21</sup>LTC Echevarria is the director of national security affairs in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

<sup>22</sup>Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought,” *Naval War College Review*, Winter 2003. The hatred of apostasy refers to former devote Muslims who have chosen a secular life instead of devotion to Shariah, the laws of the Karan.

<sup>23</sup>“U.S. missiles pound targets in Afghanistan, Sudan,” CNN, available from <http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.01>, Internet, accessed 5 April 2003.

<sup>24</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-9. Logical lines of operation are used when terrain associated objectives have limited relevance.

<sup>25</sup>“Interview: U.S. Army General Tommy Franks,” Public Broadcasting System, available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/franks.html>, Internet, accessed 10 March 2003.

al Qaeda and the Taliban, and humanitarian aid are the focus of analysis.<sup>26</sup> The destruction of the Taliban was achieved through the combination of conventional and unconventional warfare. The opposition groups, advised by special operating forces (SOF), with integrated operational fires conducted the bulk of the ground assault against the Taliban military. Operational fires used targeting information from ground forces to attack the enemy from the air. Operational fires exploit real time intelligence from observers on the ground with the precision-guided munitions of the Air Force and the Navy.<sup>27</sup> Because of the cult of personality and autocratic nature of the leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban, the leadership of those organizations is a logical line of operation. The final logical line of operation of concern was humanitarian aid. Afghanistan was already facing a humanitarian crisis before Operation Enduring Freedom. A UN report dated 4 September 2001 recommended increased international aid to the region due to three years of drought, generational factional fighting, and human right violations.<sup>28</sup> The beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom also marked the departure of international organizations. Franks realized that a prioritized effort was required to avoid a humanitarian disaster among the 5 million refugees and displaced persons heavily reliant upon international assistance for their very survival.<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, the most effective method of food distribution is by road. Initial airdrops of 37,000 meals a day did little to arrest the starvation of the needy.<sup>30</sup> A secure road

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<sup>26</sup>“Statement of General R. Franks Commander in Chief US Central Command,” United States Senate, available from [http://www.senate.gov/~armed\\_services/statemnt/2001/010322tf.pdf](http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2001/010322tf.pdf), Internet, accessed on 10 March 2003.

<sup>27</sup>“FY03 NDAA\_Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command; Asst. Secy of Defense for International Security Affairs,” US House of Representatives, available from [http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has058000.000/has058000\\_0.htm](http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has058000.000/has058000_0.htm), Internet, accessed on 10 March 2003.

<sup>28</sup>“Operation Enduring Freedom and the Conflict in Afghanistan: An Update,” House of Commons, available from <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-081.pdf>, Internet, accessed on 10 March 2003.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>“Keeping all options open,” The Economist, available from [http://www.economist.com/printedition/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story\\_ID=814314](http://www.economist.com/printedition/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=814314), Internet, accessed on 10 March 2003.

network was required to maximize the efficiency of food distribution. The importance of humanitarian aid becomes more apparent when examining Operation Enduring Freedom with the joint doctrine criteria of adequate, feasible, and acceptable.

Adequacy is the first criteria analyzing Operation Enduring Freedom. The adequacy of Operation Enduring Freedom is examined in two parts. First, was the desired endstate of the campaign altered in a manner that it no longer supported the original purpose? And second, did the campaign achieve all its assigned objectives. Normally, the nesting of assumptions between the theater strategic headquarters and the operational headquarters is analyzed. In the case of Operation Enduring Freedom, the same headquarters was responsible for both; therefore, assumptions are not addressed. Franks did not address endstate on multiple occasions in his testimony to Congress, press conferences, and news releases. The endstate was implicitly discussed during a news briefing in March 2002. The lack of data points prevents an analysis of any changes to the specified endstate. Franks did discuss the mission of USCENTCOM on numerous occasions. It is assumed that endstate changes have a corresponding mission changes. Following this logic, an unwavering mission statement would indicate an unchanged endstate. During his first news conference in October 2001 after the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom, Franks stated the mission in Afghanistan is to destroy the al Qaeda terrorist network and destroy the Taliban leadership. Franks reiterated that mission statement almost verbatim in a briefing in December 2001 and during an interview in June 2002. In each of the three occasions, the response was not scripted and was given during the question and answer period. The conclusion is that the mission, and therefore the endstate, of Operation Enduring Freedom remained unchanged during its first nine months. Rumsfeld declared in March 2002 the achievement of all initial objectives.<sup>31</sup> The success of the mission proved that Operation

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<sup>31</sup>“DOD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Franks,” Department of Defense, available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2002/t03062002\\_t0306sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2002/t03062002_t0306sd.html), Internet, accessed on 17 October 2002.

Enduring Freedom met the test of adequacy within the guidelines of joint doctrine. The test of feasibility is not as single dimensional.

Feasibility is the second criteria analyzing Operation Enduring Freedom. Feasibility is in the form of three questions. First, were sufficient resources available to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom? Second, was Operation Enduring Freedom an effective employment scheme? Finally, was Operation Enduring Freedom flexible? Because the Operation Enduring Freedom ground component was predominately unconventional, the resources required were not as daunting as with a conventional heavy force. The operational fires logical line of operation did test the logistic network of the Air Force. The lack of landing rights for ground attack aircraft demanded that a system of refueling and support be established over extended distances. The lack of landing rights also prompted contingency plans to seize airfields within Afghanistan early in the campaign. Lift aircraft were just as important as attack aircraft in Afghanistan. Being a land locked country with only 30 miles of rail and a poor network of roads, logistical support was exclusively by air during the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom. During congressional testimony, Franks specifically mentions the limited number of available lift aircraft as a problem.<sup>32</sup> Fortunately, the limitation of available airlift was mitigated by an effective employment scheme.

The scheme of employment was tailored for the threat and environment. Special operating forces were tasked to make contact with opposition forces and support them with training and operational fires. Within the austere environment of Afghanistan, the opposition forces, known as the Northern Alliance, had adapted to the terrain and the spartan supply system. The Northern Alliance consisted of a loose confederation of factions with a consolidated strength

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<sup>32</sup>“FY03 NDAA\_Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command; Asst. Secy of Defense for International Security Affairs,” US House of Representatives, available from [http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has058000.000/has058000\\_0.htm](http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has058000.000/has058000_0.htm), Internet, accessed on 10 March 2003.

around 15,000 men.<sup>33</sup> They were able to mount offensives without a time consuming and resources intensive buildup. The extended operating range of Air Force and Navy aircraft permitted the establishment of staging bases locations adjacent to existing lines of communication. Operation Enduring Freedom accomplished its mission because the force structure was tailored to logistical capabilities. The ninth and final logical line of operation developed by Franks was operational maneuver. It was the only logical line of operation not employed at the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom. Operational maneuver called for the introduction of convention forces in the event that unconventional warfare failed to achieve the decisive destruction of the Taliban military. Although conventional forces were an option, there were a number of problems associated with their use. The forced entry of large formations of ground forces would require the assistance of a neighboring country. Afghanistan did not have the resources to provide any level of host nation support. The United States and its coalition partners would have to import everything that they needed. Operational maneuver provided flexibility on a limited scale. Operation Enduring Freedom proved feasible because of the success of special operating forces support opposition forces. The austere nature of the theater along with its geographic location made support for a large conventional force a dubious assumption. The result was a lack of short term flexibility until sufficient lodgment was established. However, the risk in flexibility did not impact the political or military acceptability of the operation.

For Operation Enduring Freedom to be acceptable, it must answer three questions. First, were the conditions created and the resources allocated to enable the campaign to achieve the desired endstate. Second, did the concept for achieving the endstate abide by the laws of war. Finally, was the concept of the campaign politically palatable and militarily sound. As Operation

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<sup>33</sup>“Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance,” British Broadcasting Corporation, available from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/1552994.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1552994.stm), Internet, accessed on 28 March 2003.

Enduring Freedom matured, sacrifices in force structure to reduce logistical demands became an issue. Operational fires were not effective employed during Operation Anaconda.<sup>34</sup> Operation Anaconda was a major operation to destroy al Qaeda and Taliban in the Shah-i-Kot Mountains of eastern Afghanistan. To reduce the amount of lift required for deployment and sustainment, the subordinate units did to arrive in theater with their organic artillery. It was assumed that operational fires could augment organic mortars and, therefore, achieve the desired effects. During Anaconda, the subordinate unit encountered fleeting targets which operational fires could not attack. The ground-based mortars were effective but quickly expended all of their ammunition. Although Anaconda was ultimately a success, the issue of operational fires in a tactical role is unresolved.

The issue of the status of prisoners is also unresolved. The United States continues to hold a large number of captured al Qaeda and Taliban in Guantanamo Bay. The American government is still determining if these detainees are prisoners of war, illegal combatants, or international terrorist. Their status determines the method of incarceration or prosecution. Rumsfeld publicly states that the detainees are illegal combatants.<sup>35</sup> The Third Geneva Convention stipulates that a competent tribunal determines the status of detainees.<sup>36</sup> Until the determination is made, the detainees enjoy the same rights as a prisoner of war.<sup>37</sup> The President has authorized the formation of military tribunals.<sup>38</sup> The President empowered the tribunals to

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<sup>34</sup>Robert H. McElroy, ed. Patricia Slayden Hollis, "Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda," *Field Artillery* September-October 2002, 6-8.

<sup>35</sup>"Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability after Visiting Camp X-Ray," Department of Defense, available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01282002\\_t0127sd3.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01282002_t0127sd3.html), Internet, accessed on 5 April 2003.

<sup>36</sup>"Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949," International Committee of the Red Cross, available from <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57KJAW!Open>, Internet, accessed on 5 April 2003.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>"President Issues Military Order," White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html>, Internet, accessed on 5 April 2003.

determine detainee disposition and prosecute terrorists and individuals who harbor terrorists.<sup>39</sup>

There is public debate on the legitimacy of military tribunals.<sup>40</sup> The verdicts of military tribunals are not subject to review by American or international courts.<sup>41</sup> The fear is the lack of judicial oversight will lead to injustice.

The third component of acceptability is not contentious. After the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, there was near universal approval within the United States for Operation Enduring Freedom. Public approval ratings of military action in Afghanistan exceeded ninety percent in October 2001. If anything, the public and the government want to expand the scope of the operation to more efficiently identify and destroy remnant elements of al Qaeda and the Taliban. As mission accomplishment is the overriding component of adequacy, public approval is the overriding component of acceptability. While minor discrepancies exist on the force structure, the operation is militarily sound. The disposition of detained al Qaeda and Taliban leaders remains an issue. While it may become a more volatile issue, the American public still remembers 11 September, and they do not become misty eyed at the sight of alleged terrorists enduring the hardships of confinement.

In summary, this chapter offers proof that Operation Enduring Freedom is an effective campaign. Key national policy documents provide the strategic aims and the strategic military objectives of the war on terrorism. Although the terminal campaign is not currently known, the guidance for conflict termination derived from the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Report provide a point of departure for enabling campaigns. The problem is related to the argument made by Echevarria that the al Qaeda center of gravity is a common hatred of apostasy. Al Qaeda, as a globally dispersed decentralized terrorist network, has a center

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>“Debate on Military Tribunals Intensifies,” US Department of State, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01120300.htm>, Internet, accessed 5 April 2003.

<sup>41</sup>“President Issues Military Order,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html>, Internet, accessed on 5 April 2003.

of gravity that is unassailable by military attack. Echevarria insists that the terminal campaign to defeat terrorism in the USCENTCOM AOR is a combination of diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives.<sup>42</sup> Such a campaign nested within Bush's second line of operation detailed in his National Security Strategy, the use of information operations to attack the underlying conditions that promote terrorism. The operational objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom create the conditions for successful employment of the full spectrum of sources of power in the course of the terminal campaign. The theater strategic and operational objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom are nested within the conflict termination guidance. This linkage proves that Operation Enduring Freedom is an enabling campaign. The evaluation of the effectiveness of Operational Enduring Freedom is achieved through the analysis of the elements of operational design using joint doctrine criteria of adequate, feasible, and acceptable. Operation Enduring Freedom proved effective due to a scheme of maneuver that balanced available resources and the endstate. Because the endstate did not change during the course of the operation, the initial scheme of maneuver was not required to adapt to an incremental change in the mission. As a result, there were no pronounced shortcomings in flexibility. Limitations in flexibility were also overcome by using logical lines of operation. Logical lines of operation facilitated simultaneous operations against multiple decisive points from the initial introduction of forces into Afghanistan. While the shortcoming in flexibility was mitigated through a well defined mission and simultaneous operations, an improvement in the tailoring of the force to increase rotary wing lift and robust organic fires are lessons to take forward. The comparison of the Italian Campaign to Operation Enduring Freedom reveals additional lessons for the future of Operation Enduring Freedom and future operations in the war on terrorism.

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<sup>42</sup>Echevarria II, "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought."

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The synthesis of doctrine, historical case study, and recent operations answers the question of the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom as an enabling campaign. This chapter provides that answer and also addresses the lessons learned applicable to future operations. An effective enabling campaign answers two questions. First, was the campaign adequate, feasible, and acceptable in accordance with joint doctrine? And second, were the operational objectives nested within the theater strategic objectives? In this chapter, these two questions are answered through a comparison of the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom. The Italian Campaign exhibits the benefits of sound planning and the repercussions of poor planning. Applying those insights to Operation Enduring Freedom adds rigor to the conclusion that Operation Enduring Freedom was effective. The Italian Campaign also demonstrated the indirect relationship between strategic endstate and operational objectives indicative of an enabling campaign. Establishing a similar linkage in Operation Enduring Freedom would support the conclusion that Operation Enduring was an effective enabling campaign. Detracting conditions identified in joint doctrine analysis and inconsistencies in the nesting of objectives are examined for possible lessons learned. Lessons applicable to future operations are explored in detail and mitigating actions are recommended. In the end, the importance of Operation Enduring Freedom as an effective enabling campaign is understood and the implications for the future of the war on terror are clear. Operation Enduring Freedom should mirror the Italian Campaign as an effective enabling campaign that helped create the conditions for the terminal campaign.

By examining the strengths and weaknesses of the Italian Campaign in comparison to Operation Enduring Freedom, the conclusion that Operation Enduring Freedom is an effective campaign is further validated and lessons are learned. In the Italian Campaign, major operations

were inconsistent with the intent of the campaign. The Italian Campaign theater strategic objectives, as stated in chapter three, were the elimination of Italy from the war and the fixing of German forces. Operation Shingle attempted a winter offensive against dominating terrain and well prepared defensive positions along a weather constrained avenue of approach. With a stalled landing at Anzio and tactical defeats at Cassino, Alexander considering delaying further action until the drier and warmer months of spring but was encouraged to continue the offensive by Churchill.<sup>1</sup> The ill-advised offensive failed to produce results until the weather improved in the late spring. In January 1945, another offensive was conducted despite the fact that the German forces in Italy could no longer influence the campaign in Northern Europe. The meager territorial gains were inconsequential to the peace agreement signed a few months later. In both examples, the major operations were inconsistent with the theater strategic objective of fixing German forces. The lesson applied to Operation Enduring Freedom and future operations is major operations should support the intent of the campaign and military necessity should outweigh political necessity in an economy of force theater. Rumsfeld declared the theater strategic objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom achieved in March 2002. If true, the availability of forces in Afghanistan should not dictate a new objective inconsistent with the enabling intent of Operation Enduring Freedom in the war on terrorism. The purpose of an enabling campaign is to facilitate the terminal campaign and any other purpose is dubious.

The validation of an enabling campaign is the nesting of operational objectives within the strategic endstate. In the case study of the Italian Campaign, Alexander determined the operational objectives of seizing Naples and moving north of Rome. The operational objectives supported the theater strategic objectives of defeating Italy and the fixing German forces. The theater strategic purpose was to create conditions for Operation Overlord and the invasion of

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<sup>1</sup>Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol 5: *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 509.

Northern Europe. Operation Overlord and its sequels were the terminal campaign to achieve the strategic endstate, the destruction of Nazi Germany. In comparison, Franks established nine logical lines of operation focused on achieving an effect linked to a decisive point. Logical lines of operation are a doctrinal correct alternative to geographic objectives in an environment without positional relevance.<sup>2</sup> The logical lines of operation supported the theater strategic objectives of destroying the al Qaeda terrorist network and removing the Taliban government. The linkage of theater strategic objectives to the terminal campaign is problematic. The one shortcoming of Operation Enduring Freedom is the absence of an identified terminal campaign. Although the terminal campaign is missing, the strategic endstate is known. The strategic endstate is the destruction of terrorist networks and the neutralization of rogue regimes.<sup>3</sup> By implication, the USCENTCOM terminal campaign in the war on terror must achieve that endstate.

The center of gravity analysis recognized a difference between Afghanistan and the broader AOR. According to Echevarria, the al Qaeda center of gravity within the AOR is the hatred of apostasy. The conceptual nature of the center of gravity precludes the military as the main effort of the terminal campaign. The main effort requires a diplomatic or informational campaign. Operation Enduring Freedom is an enabling campaign if and only if it supports a diplomatic or informational campaign with the objective neutralizing hatred of apostasy.

Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom, the prospect of a successful American diplomatic or information campaign in Afghanistan was nonexistent. Operation Enduring Freedom enabled the resumption of diplomatic relations. The conditions are now created for the introduction of diplomatic or informational initiatives intent on eliminating the hatred of apostasy. The link of Operation Enduring Freedom to the future terminal campaign proves Operation Enduring

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<sup>2</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-9.

<sup>3</sup>“Presidential Address to the Nation,” White House, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>, Internet, accessed 4 September 2002.

Freedom is an enabling campaign. By understanding the purpose of the future terminal campaign, the operational commander is capable of designing an effective enabling campaign.

It is arguable that any terminal campaign in the war on terror would require an enabling campaign in Afghanistan. It is also arguable that military operations may mitigate the effectiveness of the diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives proposed by Echevarria and others. Both arguments are correct. There are decisive points in the broader war on terror that are only assailable to military force. Other decisive points, including the al Qaeda center of gravity, are only assailable by the use of something other than force. A coordinated and integrated campaign plan for the war on terror would identify the sequencing and prerequisite conditions of major campaigns undertaken with all of the elements of national power. It is recommended that the USCENTCOM develop a comprehensive campaign plan for the war on terror. It is inconceivable that a campaign plan is not constructed or currently under review.

Procedurally, the campaign plan must begin with the terminal campaign. If Franks agrees that the terrorist center of gravity is a hatred of apostasy, he must determine the diplomatic, economic, and informational assets required. If not attached or organic, he must request or create those assets. At the regional combatant commander level, mission need statements for non military capabilities are just as important as the need for military materiel. The analysis of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities will reveal the decisive points. The decisive points are attacked in sequence or simultaneously to create the conditions for successful employment of the terminal campaign. Intelligence assets are prioritized against those conditions and the threats to those conditions. The information provided by the intelligence assets are used to make decisions to exploit success and mitigate failures. It sounds simplistic. The difference between the past and now is the new national security strategy. Under the new strategy, conditions are proactively created. In a press briefing on 6 March 2002, Rumsfeld stated it up best, “A terrorist under fire in the mountains of Afghanistan is a terrorist who has bigger problems than trying to

plan the next attack on the United States.”<sup>4</sup> The lessons learned during Operation Enduring Freedom, if institutionalized, will facilitate future operations in the war on terror.

Lessons for future operations are also gleamed from a comparison of the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom using the joint doctrine criteria. Using the principles of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability in the comparison of the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom, operations in Afghanistan compare favorably to operations in Italy. It was demonstrated that endstate of both the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom were nested within strategic aims and national military objectives. However, the intent of Allied operations changed after achievement of initial objectives. In 1945, with the German forces in Italy unable to influence the terminal campaign in northern Europe, the Allies continued to mount offensives. At some point, the mission in the Italian Campaign changed in accordance with the forces available instead of remaining focus upon the national military objective of fixing German forces to facilitate the campaign across France and into Germany. In Operation Enduring Freedom, the mission and intent remained on the destruction of the al Qaeda terrorist network within Afghanistan and the destruction of the Taliban leadership.

Both the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom faced issues in the area of feasibility. The rugged terrain and unsecured road network in Italy and Afghanistan hampered logistical support. Both campaigns also encountered limitations in lift support: for Alexander, it was the availability of sealift and, for Franks, it was the availability of airlift. Additionally, both campaigns were limited in the force structure available to execute the task. In the case of the Italian Campaign, the invasion of France had priority. The Italian Campaign was consistently asked to sacrifice troops and resources to weight the effort of Overlord. In the case of Operation

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<sup>4</sup>“DOD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Franks,” US Department of Defense, available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2002/t03062002\\_t0306sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2002/t03062002_t0306sd.html), Internet, accessed 17 October 2002.

Enduring Freedom, ongoing commitments outside of the USCENTCOM AOR and preparations for future operations within the USCENTCOM AOR reduced available assets.

Both the Italian Campaign and Operation Enduring Freedom enjoyed popular and political support. However, the joint doctrine definition of acceptable stipulates that the mission is accomplished with available resources without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, or materiel. The concept adopted by Eisenhower to achieve tactical objectives through the sheer weight of resources was not as efficient as the unconventional warfare adopted by Franks. Because of the attrition-based nature of the Italian Campaign, on average more soldiers were killed in action in a single day than all of the American casualties of Operation Enduring Freedom combined (as of 10 March 2003).<sup>5</sup>

In summary, Frank's innovative concept of the operation preserved his most vital resource, American soldiers, while accomplishing the mission. Operation Enduring Freedom was an effective enabling campaign because of the indirect supporting relationship to the strategic endstate. The unwavering endstate prevented a dilution of effort. The risk to future Afghan operations is losing sight of the conflict termination conditions. In Italy, the commander achieved the objectives but lost sight of the endstate within the theater. In USCENTCOM, Operation Enduring Freedom has enabled the initiation of diplomatic and information initiatives to attack the al Qaeda center of gravity. If the terminal campaign of diplomacy and information are not undertaken, Operation Enduring Freedom was a waste of time, men, and money.

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<sup>5</sup>“World War II,” Center for Military History, available from <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/eacmp.htm>, Internet, accessed on 5 April 2003. The United States suffered 114,000 casualties during the Italian Campaign. The Italian Campaign lasted 678 days. On average, the United States suffered 168 casualties a day.

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